University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Departmental Technical Reports (CS)

Computer Science

5-2000

How Important is Theory for Practical Problems? A Partial
Explanation of Hartmanis' Observation
Vladik Kreinovich
The University of Texas at El Paso, vladik@utep.edu

Luc Longpre
The University of Texas at El Paso, longpre@utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons

Comments:
UTEP-CS-00-21.
Published in Bulletin on the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science EATCS,
2000, Vol. 71, pp. 160-164.
Recommended Citation
Kreinovich, Vladik and Longpre, Luc, "How Important is Theory for Practical Problems? A Partial
Explanation of Hartmanis' Observation" (2000). Departmental Technical Reports (CS). 478.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep/478

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Departmental Technical Reports (CS) by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

How Important Is Theory for Practical Problems? A
Partial Explanation of Hartmanis' Observation
Vladik Kreinovich and Luc Longpre
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
500 W. University
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
fvladik,longpreg@cs.utep.edu

Hartmanis' observation. How important is theory for practical problems? In his recent talk

4], J. Hartmanis analyzed several cases when a long-standing open theoretical problem was solved,
and came up with a rather unexpected conclusion: that if some theoretical result is very di cult
to prove or disprove, then usually, this result has little or no practical usefulness.
This observation seemed troubling to us, because it runs contrary to the usual theoreticians'
belief that complex theoretical results are practically useful. Because of this, we decided to formalize
this observation and to investigate whether Hartmanis' informal statement is true or not in the
resulting formalization. We started with a very simple formalization, and, somewhat to our surprise,
discovered that in this simple formalization, Hartmanis' intuition is right and our original intuition
was wrong: complex theoretical results are indeed, in some precise sense, of little practical use.
Thus, this gives a (partial) explanation of Hartmanis' observation.
In this paper, we describe this result. Our result is simple, but we believe the readers will
be interested because it does provide a justication of an otherwise unexplained observation. Of
course, the reader should take into consideration that this result is based on a rather simple possible
formalization, and more adequate and more sophisticated formalizations are necessary.
Towards formalization: general idea. In order to formalize Hartmanis's observation, we need
to formalize two intuitive notions: what it means for a statement S to be \practically useful", and
what it means for a statement to be \di cult to prove".
Both terms are di cult to formalize in a way that would best t our intuitive understanding
of the corresponding notions. In view of this di culty, we will only formalize the features of these
notions which are necessary to prove our formal version of Hartmanis' statement. Namely, we will
dene the following three notions:
The rst is the notion of a potential application this notion will be dened in such a way that
every application (in the intuitive sense of this word) is also (hopefully) an application in the
sense of this denition.
As we will see from our denition, the inverse is not necessarily true: a potential application in the sense of our denition is not necessarily an application in the intuitive
sense of this word.
The second notion will be related to the usefulness of an application.
1

The third is the notion of a potentially complex proof this notion will be dened in such a
way that every proof which is complex in the intuitive sense is also complex in the sense of
our denition.
Again, the inverse is not necessarily true: a proof which is potentially complex in the
sense of our denition is not necessarily complex in the intuitive sense of this word in
the last section of this paper, we speculate on how to make this denition closer to the
intuitive notion of proof complexity.
Our result will then be that whenever we have a potential application of a potentially complex
proof, this potentially application is not very useful. As we have just mentioned, we are choosing
our denitions in such a way that:
every application (in the intuitive sense of this word) is a potential application in the formal
sense, and
every proof which is complex in the intuitive sense is also potentially complex in the sense of
our denition.
Thus, from our formal (proved) proposition, we can make an informal conclusion: that every
application of a complex proof is not very useful.
Before we give formal denitions, let us rst provide motivations for them.
Towards dening potential applications. Let us start with the notion of a potential application. A typical expected practical application of a theoretical statement S is that it would lead to
a practical algorithm for solving a practically useful problem. For example, one of the remaining
long-standing important open problems in mathematics is the generalized Riemann hypothesis it
is known that if Riemann's hypothesis is true, then a certain fast and simple algorithm U would
be a (provable) primality test (see, e.g., 1, 6]).
Without the Riemann's hypothesis, we can only conclude that the algorithm U is correct if it
says that a given number n is composite if the algorithm U concludes that n is prime, then, without
Riemann's hypothesis, it may be possible that n is actually a composite number n = n1  n2 for
some integers ni > 1. Thus, the correctness of the algorithm U means that for every pair (n1  n2 )
of integers ni > 1, the result of applying the algorithm U to the product n1  n2 is \composite".
Since the algorithm U is feasible, we can express its correctness as 8n1 8n2 A(n1  n2 ), where A is a
feasible (polynomial-time computable) predicate. This formula can be further simplied as follows:
by adding 0's in front of one of ni , we can always guarantee that the binary descriptions of ni
have the same length (or lengths diering by 1). Thus, the correctness of the algorithm U can be
described as 8x P (x), where x runs over all possible binary input strings, and P (x) is a feasible
predicate (namely, the result of applying U to the product n1  n2 , where n1 is the integer whose
binary code is the rst half of the string x, and n2 is the integer whose binary code is the second
half of x).
Similarly, in general, by a potential application of a statement S , we mean the fact that from S ,
we can conclude that 8x P (x), where x runs over all binary strings, and P (x) is a feasible predicate.
In accordance to what we mentioned in describing the general idea of our paper, this formulation
only works one way: a \potential application" in the above sense means that we have deduced an
implication S ) 8x P (x), but the fact that we have this implication for some predicate P (x) does
not necessarily mean that S is a real application (because the only thing we require about the
predicate P (x) is that it is feasible, and not all feasible predicates come from useful algorithms
like U ).
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Towards dening potential usefulness. The fact that P (x) is a potential (or even real) appli-

cation of a statement S does not necessarily mean that this is actually a useful application.
For example, if we can easily prove the universal statement 8x P (x) without using the complex
statement S , then S is clearly not useful at all in guaranteeing that the algorithm (corresponding
to the predicate P (x)) works for all inputs x.
Similarly, if we can prove, without using the statement S , that P (x) is true for \almost all"
x (i.e., for a large portion of the strings) { and therefore, that for almost all inputs, we can
guarantee that the corresponding algorithm works correctly { then, intuitively, for this application,
the statement S is not very useful.
We can, therefore, dene the usefulness of a statement S in an application P (x) for given input
length n as, e.g., the largest portion of the strings for which P (x) is true irrespective of whether S
is true or not.
To avoid dening too many new terms, we will not give a new denition for usefulness, but we
will incorporate this notion into our main result.
Towards dening a notion of a potentially complex proof. Let us now consider how to
formalize the notion of a \potentially complex proof". In mathematical logic, a complexity of the
proof is often measured by its length. So, it seems reasonable to dene a potential complexity of a
proof as its length, and a potential complexity of a statement as the shortest length of its proof.
The reason why we added the word \potentially" is that this denition does not necessarily
coincide with the intuitive notion of a complexity of a proof. This is especially true if we measure
the length of a traditional proof in, say, rst order logic, or any other similar formalism. For
example, intuitively, a long proof which consists of a series of long routine computations (e.g., a
straightforward proof of an arithmetic equality) is complex in the above sense, but intuitively, it is
clearly simpler than a short proof which consists of several di cult-to-grasp innovative ideas. In
short, if a certain part of a proof can be easily programmed and implemented by a computer, then
this part is (intuitively) simple. To eliminate this discrepancy between the intuitive and formalized
complexity of a proof, it makes sense to count each simple application of a feasible program as a
single step of the proof.
Since we mentioned a computer, it makes sense to add that a computer can also use a random
number generator (we mean a true random number generator, in which random numbers come from
the physical process like a resistor noise and not from a pseudo-random algorithm). The reason
why this addition is useful is that, e.g., if we have two dierent functions f1 (x) and f2 (x) from real
numbers to real numbers, then it is very easy to prove that they are dierent by simply plugging
in a random number  into both functions: if f1 () 6= f2 (), then the functions fi(x) are dierent,
and, e.g., for analytical functions, the probability that f () = f1 () ; f2 () = 0 is (close to) 0.
It therefore makes sense, when dening the proof's complexity, to consider one call to a random
number generator as one step of the proof.
As a result, we arrive at the following denitions:

Denition 1.

Let L be a xed rst order language, with axioms and deduction rules (e.g., language of set
theory which is used as a basis for mathematics). For this language, we have a natural notion
of a proof.
Let S be a statement from the language L. By a potential application of S , we mean a feasible
predicate P (x) (whose truth value is dened for an arbitrary binary string x), for which we
have a proof p (of length len(p)) of the implication S ) 8x P (x).
3

Denition 2. By a computer proof of a statement from L, we mean a sequence of steps of the

following type:
generating a random binary string of a given length n
checking whether a given feasible predicate Q(x) holds for a given binary string x
applying one deduction step (of the original deduction system).
By the potential complexity of a computer proof, we mean the total complexity of all its steps,
where:
a generating step has complexity n, and
a checking or a deduction step have complexity 1.
Let " < 1 be a positive real number. We say that the computer proof is correct if it leads to a
correct proof with probability  1 ; ".
Comment. We dened each checking step as having complexity 1. Alternatively, we could dene its
complexity as the number of elementary computational steps which are necessary for this checking.
Since we only consider feasible (polynomial time) algorithms P (x), with the new denition, we can
prove a similar proposition (with a slightly dierent numerical estimate).
Denition 3. Let C be a positive integer. We say that a statement S is C -potentially complex if
any correct computer proof of S or :S has potential complexity  C .
Proposition. Let S be a C -potentially complex statement, and let P (x) be its potential application
(with a proof p of length len(p)). Then, regardless of whether S is true or not, for every integer n,
the portion Pn of strings x of length n for which the predicate P (x) is true satises the inequality
Pn  "n=(C ;len(p);2) .
Comment. When the statement is very complex (i.e., C is large), and the strings are of reasonable
length (i.e., n is small), then n C , and

ln(
"
)
n
")  n :
n=(C ;len(p);2)
"
= exp ; C ; len(p) ; 2
1 ; C ;ln(len(
p) ; 2
Since C n, this probability is very close to 1. Thus, if, from a complex theoretical statement
S , we can deduce a universal practically motivated statement 8x P (x), then even without S , for a
reasonable length n, we can guarantee that P (x) is true for \almost all" strings of this length.
In our motivation of the notion of a potential application, we mentioned that the intended
meaning of the truth value of a predicate P (x) for a given string x is that a certain practical algorithm works correctly for this input x. In these terms, the above proposition means the following:
for \almost all" inputs, we do not need the complex statement S to guarantee that the practical
algorithm works for these inputs.
Proof. If S is true, then 8x P (x) is also true, so the portion Pn is equal to 1. Therefore, to prove
the proposition, it is su cient to consider the case when S is false. Let us prove that in this case, if
Pn < "n=(C ;len(p);2) , then, contrary to our assumption, we will get a computer proof of :S whose
potential complexity is < C .
Indeed, from S ) 8x P (x), it follows that for any string z , we have :P (z ) ) :S . Thus, for
any positive integer t, we can consider the following computer proof: t times run a random number
generator to generate a random string  of length n, and then check whether P () is true. If P ()
4

is false for one of these strings , then use the proof p to conclude that :S . The total potential
complexity of this proof is t  n +len(p)+1 (one step to conclude :S from :P () and S ) 8x P (x)).
Thus, if t < (C ; len(p) ; 1)=n (e.g., if t (C ; len(p) ; 2)=n), then we get a computer proof of
:S of potential complexity < C .
To get a contradiction with our assumption, we must show that this computer proof is correct,
i.e., that it leads to an actual proof with a probability  1 ; ". Let us check this inequality. For
each , the probability that P () holds is equal to Pn . Since consequent tests are independent,
the probability that P () will be true for all t tests is equal to Pnt . Thus, with probability 1 ; Pnt ,
we get a string  for which :P (), and hence, a proof of :S . Thence, if 1 ; Pnt  1 ; " (which is
equivalent to Pnt "), this computer proof is correct. So, if Pn "1=t , we get a contradiction. Thus,
Pn > "1=t . Substituting the above formula for t, we get the desired inequality. The proposition is
proven.
Where do we go from here. As we have mentioned, we only provide a rather simple formalization of Hartmanis' idea. In particular, our formalization of the proof's complexity is very crude.
Just like a more intuitive formalization of the notion of complexity of a string is its Kolmogorov
complexity, probably a better formalization of the notion of complexity of a proof p is a (resourcebounded) Kolmogorov complexity of this proof (resource-bounded since we are interested in feasible
algorithms only) 2, 5]. For this formalization, we expect a similar result. (Note a similarity with
3], where we showed the relation between Kolmogorov complexity and testing program correctness,
i.e., a statement of the similar type 8x P (x).)
Acknowledgments. This work is supported in part by NASA under cooperative agreement NCC5209, by NSF grants No. DUE-9750858 and CDA-9522207, by United Space Alliance, grant No. NAS
9-20000 (PWO C0C67713A6), by the Future Aerospace Science and Technology Program (FAST)
Center for Structural Integrity of Aerospace Systems, eort sponsored by the Air Force O ce of
Scientic Research, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under grant number F49620-95-1-0518,
and by the National Security Agency under Grant No. MDA904-98-1-0561.

References
1] E. Bach, Analytic methods in the analysis and design of number-theoretic algorithms, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1985.
2] C. Calude, Information and randomness: An algorithmic perspective, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
1994.
3] A. Q. Gates, V. Kreinovich, and L. Longpre, \Kolmogorov Complexity Justies Software Engineering Heuristics", Bulletin of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science
(EATCS), 1998, Vol. 66, pp. 150{154.
4] J. Hartmanis, The P vs. NP Problem, Unpublished talk at New Mexico State University, Las
Cruces, NM, October 11, 1999.
5] M. Li and P. Vitanyi, An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications, SpringerVerlag, N.Y., 1997.
6] G. L. Miller, \Riemann's hypothesis and tests for primality", Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 1976, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 300{317.
5

